## Law and Economics



Advocate B.Sc. LL.M. (Pune), LL.M. In International Economic Law (Warwick, U.K. )

#### Sayali Ganu-Dabake,

Advocate LL.M. (Business Laws), M.B.L., PGDIPRL, LL.M. (Health & Media Laws)

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Articles by Ronald Coase

Externality problem

- Actions of business firms with harmful effects on others

# Pigouvian Approach

Regouvian approach

- Cost Taxes (Environmental taxes = pollution damages)
- ☑ Damages (to Victim)
- 🛯 Subsidies

Regulation (to shift Injurer to other zone)

- According to Coase -
  - Approach inappropriate, with undesirable results
  - Reciprocal nature of the Problem

  - R Problem is to avoid more serious harm

 Named so by George Stigler (1966)
 Coase did not state it in the form of theorem Various versions

R Stigler

under perfect competition, private and social costs will be equal

if one assumes rationality, no transaction costs & legal impediment to bargaining, all misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the market by bargaining

Rev Polinsky (1974)

if transaction costs are zero, the structure of law does not matter because efficiency will result in any case

When parties can bargain together and settle their disagreements by co-operation, their behaviour will be efficient, regardless of underlying rule of law

Refficiency Hypothesis

Regardless of how rights are initially assigned, the resulting allocation of resources will be efficient.

**R** Invariance Hypothesis

The final allocation of resources will be invariant under alternative assignments of rights

Reak version encompasses only efficiency hypothesis

- i) Confectioner & Doctor (Sturges v/s Bridgmen, 1879)
- ii) Rancher and Farmer straying cattles
- iii) Contamination of stream killing fish in the pondiv) Smoke pollution
- v) Railway engine sparks and neighbouring farmers vi) Shadow on swimming pool (Florida, 1959)

Assumptions Raised
 Zero transaction costs
 Initial allocation and rights specified
 Free market and bargain

#### Coase Lesson

Call Law and legal rights certain
Call Institutions of Property rights and Contracts
Call Initial allocation efficient
Call Bargain impediments to be reduced
Call Law to reduce transaction costs
Call Law should be efficient
Court approach to promote efficiency